Trust Centre
What AWARE actually does, what it depends on, and where its limits are. Only claims with documentary evidence appear here.
Trust boundaries
Agent boundary
The agent is untrusted. It holds a credential and presents it. It is never trusted to authorise itself.
Control plane
Gateway, coordinator, identity registry and policy engine are the trust boundary’s inside. Decisions are made here, not by the agent.
Target boundary
The system being acted on. Today AWARE does not verify what happens inside this boundary — see execution assurance.
Cryptographic mechanisms
| Mechanism | Algorithm | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Credential storage | PBKDF2, per-credential salt, server-side pepper | Stored credentials are not recoverable |
| Credential comparison | Constant-time | No timing oracle on verification |
| Credential generation | 32 bytes CSPRNG | Unguessable provisioning secrets |
| Session token | JWT, HS256 | Carries trust domain, blast radius, session id, execution context |
| Audit chain | SHA-256 over canonical serialisation plus previous hash | Tamper-evident decision history |
| Key-bound identity | — | Not implemented. No X.509, Ed25519 or SPIFFE. |
Compliance mappings
Seven frameworks are registered in the framework mapper, with the versions below.
| Framework | Version | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | v1 | 184 of 243 control IDs, across all 18 domains |
| NIST AI Risk Management Framework | 1.0 | Govern, Map, Measure, Manage |
| ISO/IEC 27001 | 2022 | Annex A control mapping |
| ISO/IEC 42001 | v1.0-2026-07-28 | AI management system controls |
| OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 | v1.0-2026 | Full catalogue |
| OWASP Top 10 for MCP | 2025 | 10 of 10 classes |
| DORA | 2022 | Operational resilience mapping |
| MITRE ATLAS | v2026.06 | Technique mapping, 7 initial rule functions |
Security testing methodology
- Unit and integration suites run on the standard Node test runner, with separate standards suites per compliance framework.
- Playwright covers browser-level behaviour of the operator UI.
- Dependency and secret scanning run as part of the release process: gitleaks, npm audit and trivy reports are kept in the repository.
- The npm publication boundary is enforced by a publish guard that packs from a clean detached worktree at the release tag and refuses to publish a tarball that differs from it.
Vulnerability disclosure
AWARE publishes a security policy and a SECURITY.md with a coordinated disclosure route. Report a vulnerability rather than disclosing it publicly. Contact: security@goodciso.org. A security.txt is served under /.well-known/.
Data handling
AWARE stores agent identity records, policy state and audit records. Credentials are stored as salted, peppered hashes and are never recoverable. Audit records can be exported and are intended to be retained by the operator; the retention period is the operator’s choice and is not imposed by the product.